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volatility∗†
Antoine Mandel‡§, Simone Landini¶, Mauro Gallegati‖, Herbert Gintis∗∗
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Abstract
Within a standard framework a` la Arrow-Debreu, we investigate the
dynamics emerging from the interactions of heterogeneous households and
firms that are adaptive price setters and financially constrained. We show
that depending on the stringency of the financial constraints the model can
settle in two very different regimes: one characterized by equilibrium, the
other by disequilibrium and financial fragility. We then investigate how
the structure of the production network affects the emergence of aggregate
volatility from micro-level price and financial shocks, hence providing a
dynamical counterpart to recent results of Acemoglu and al (2012).
1 Introduction
A series of recent studies, in particular Gabaix (2011) and Acemoglu et al.
(2012), analyzes macroeconomic volatility as a deviation from the central limit
theorem in the diversification of idiosyncratic productivity shocks occurring at
the firm or at the sectoral level. Quantitative estimates performed by these
authors on the basis of US data indicate that the induced fluctuations would be
of the same order of magnitude as the actual fluctuations of GDP.
The work by Gabaix shows that in an economy where the distribution of
firms is fat-tailed, volatility brought about by independent productivity shocks
decays logarithmically with the number of firms. Acemoglu and co-authors
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adopt an approach similar to this of Fisher and Vega-Redondo (2006) or Bat-
tiston et al. (2007) and treat the input-output structure of a multi-sectoral
economy as a weighted network. They show that the rate of decay of aggre-
gate volatility in response to sectoral productivity shocks depends crucially on
the degree distribution of the production network, i.e on inter-sectoral linkages.
To take an extreme example, in a star-shaped network, a shock on the central
sector triggers an equivalent variation at the aggregate level.
These results potentially represent major advances in our understanding of
macro-economic fluctuations and the unfolding of crisis. Yet, they abstract
away from the actual mechanics of crisis and the temporal dimension embedded
in the idea of fluctuation, as they are essentially static and asymptotic: they
describe the limit properties of a sequence of economies as the number of firms
or of sectors tends towards infinity. Therefore, their relevance is conditional on
the existence of a model that provides a micro-economic description of the gen-
eration and the propagation of shocks and allows to reproduce dynamically the
emergence of aggregate volatility. Agent-based models, which allow to simulate
the evolution of complex economic systems formed by heterogeneous interact-
ing agents (see LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008, for an introduction), are the ideal
candidate to provide micro-foundations to these results that crucially rely on
non-linearity and deviation from Gaussian standards.
As far as Gabaix (2011) is concerned, there are strong empirical evidence on
the fat-tailed distribution of firms’ size (see Axtell, 2001, and the subsequent
literature) and a number of recent contributions provide micro-founded agent-
based models that reproduce the emergence of both fat-tailed distribution of
firms and macroeconomic volatility (see in particular Delli Gatti et al., 2005;
Dosi et al., 2010).
Concerning the contribution by Acemoglu et al. (2012), it is grounded in a
static version of the equilibrium real-business cycle model of Long and Plosser
(1983). Consequently it lacks a temporal dimension and ought to measure “ag-
gregate volatility” through a comparative static analysis of the level of GDP at
different equilibria. We shall argue that volatility is much more likely to mate-
rialize out of equilibrium, e.g when the economy transits between two equilibria
following a productivity shock. However, performing such a disequilibrium anal-
ysis requires a dynamical model that can represent both processes of convergence
to and of divergence from an equilibrium.
The efforts of general equilibrium theory in that direction were based on
centralized price adjustment processes, first the walrasian taˆtonnement and then
non-taˆtonnement processes (see Be´nassy, 2005, for a recent account). These
efforts were almost entirely stopped by the impossibility results put forward
in the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem. As far as agent-based models
are concerned, they have until now focused mainly on disequilibrium situations
and neglected to establish an explicit link to general equilibrium. Yet, the
paradigmatic shift to a decentralized and disaggregated approach of economic
dynamics can also shed new light on the issue of price dynamics. As a matter of
fact, recent work of ours show that evolutionary learning of heterogeneous price
setting agents provide a viable alternative to the Walrasian taˆtonnement (see
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Gintis, 2007; Gintis and Mandel, 2012). Brought together with previous work on
financial fragility developed in a series of models with heterogeneous interacting
agents by Delli Gatti, Gallegati and co-authors (most recently Delli Gatti et al.,
2010; Battiston et al., 2012a), this approach allows us to propose, in this paper,
a model of an economy a` la Long and Plosser that accounts on the one hand
for processes of convergence towards equilibrium and on the other hand for
the endogenous creation of shocks, disequilibrium and aggregate volatility. The
model is stock-flow consistent and dynamically complete.
We then use this model to investigate wether dynamic counterparts of Ace-
moglu et al. (2012) results hold, that is how the structure of the production
network affects the speed at which the model relaxes to equilibrium and the
magnitude of fluctuations thereabout. Additionnaly, our model sheds light on
the relationships between agent-based models a` la Delli Gatti et al. and equi-
librium: it allows to track how financial fragility comes about and propagates
in a stock-flow consistent model. For example, basic accounting shows that if
the monetary mass is constant, the financial profits of a sector are the losses of
another. This implies that the deviation of prices from their (zero-profit) equi-
librium values are likely driver of losses, financial fragility, bankruptcies and
that endogenous monetary creation is necessary to sustain an economy out-of-
equilibrium. Conversely, equilibrium appears as the only sustainable state of
the economy in absence of monetary creation.
There is a substantial literature on the origin of aggregate fluctuations with
close connections to our work. (Horvath, 1998, 2000) and Dupor (1999) dis-
cuss the aggregation of sectoral shocks in a general equilibrium setting. Bak
et al. (1993) looks at self-organized criticality in production networks and show
that independent shocks fail to cancel in the aggregate if interaction are lo-
cal and technologies non-convex. A wealth of agent-based models investigates
further the interplay between local interactions and aggregate fluctuations (see
among others Dosi et al., 2010; Dawid et al., 2011; Mandel et al., 2010; Wolf
et al., 2013). Our own contribution is closely related to the work of Delli Gatti,
Gallegati and co-authors (see Delli Gatti et al., 2005, and further references)
emphasizing scaling laws and financial fragility as sources of macroeconomic
volatility. Among those contributions, Battiston et al. (2007) is the closer to
ours as it allows for an arbitrary number of sectors.
With respect to the equilibrium literature, our contribution is to ground ex-
isting results on the non-diversification of shocks in a dynamical setting with
heterogenous interacting agents and to allow for the endogenous generation and
propagation of shocks via bankruptcies, defaults and network-based financial
accelerator mechanisms (see Delli Gatti et al., 2010) thanks to the introduction
of out-of-equilibrium dynamics and of an explicit financial structure. In partic-
ular, we address some of the research questions put forward in Acemoglu et al.
(2012): “another important area for future research is a systematic analysis of
the relationship between the structure of financial networks and the extent of
contagion and cascading failures.”
With respect to the agent-based literature on financial fragility (Delli Gatti
et al., 2005, and further references), our contribution is to explicit the link of
3
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this class of models to equilibrium and thereupon to provide a stock-flow con-
sistent model of financial fragility in which losses and bankruptcies are brought
about by disequilibrium rather than by randomness. Indeed, these previous
contributions completely abstract away from the price formation process: in
(Delli Gatti et al., 2005, and further contributions) prices are drawn randomly.
Therefore, the underlying equilibrium of the model is not explicitly identified nor
is the fact that perturbations are actually drawn from a distribution centered
on this equilibrium. This missing link to equilibrium partly explains the lack of
stock-flow consistency in the model: financial shocks are caused by violations
of budgetary balance conditions rather than by disequilibrium in the economy.
Our approach is, perhaps in a metaphorical sense, more Schumpeterian: it is
out-of-equilibrium that financial fragility and bankruptcy materialize.
We use computational methods. We implement our model numerically and
analyze its properties via Monte-Carlo simulations. This is the standard ap-
proach in agent-based computational economics (see LeBaron and Tesfatsion,
2008). Yet, an important innovation of our model is its hybrid nature. Part of
the dynamics are defined by behavioral rules and local interactions as is stan-
dard in the agent-based literature, part are defined in a more axiomatic mode by
assuming some form of efficiency, and then implemented as solutions to linear
programs. This allows to reduce the number of free parameters by abstract-
ing away from the details of processes whose time-scale or magnitude is below
these of concern in the model (this perspective on time-scales is akin to this of
subscale parametrization used in climate modeling (see Edwards, 2010)). How-
ever, this approach involves solving large and complex optimization problems
on networks. Therefore it raises, for the first time as far as we understand,
the issue of computational capacity in the field of agent-based computational
economics. The simulations presented in this paper altogether required months
of computation time1 although none of them involve a large number of sectors
or of firms .
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes
the model. In section three, we investigate the interplay between equilibrium,
financial fragility and disequilibrium. Section four analyzes the relationship
between the structure of the production network, convergence to equilibrium
and aggregate volatility. Section five concludes.
2 A multisectoral model
2.1 The general equilibrium framework
We investigate the dynamics of a multi-sectoral economy built up by a large
number of households, firms and banks, interconnected via input-output, com-
mercial credit, and financial credit networks.
We represent firms as financially constrained and boundedly rational agents,
which combine intermediary inputs and labor in view of production, and adap-
1For a single-core machine.
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tively search for a profit-maximizing pricing policy. Households are inelastic
labor suppliers and, for some of them, entrepreneurs. Their wages and en-
trepreneurial profits are the only source of final demand (i.e consumption).
Banks are rule-based suppliers of short-term credit.
Intermediary consumption is financed by commercial credits and hence de-
fines two networks linking firms: one of physical/commodity flows, one of finan-
cial obligations. Wages are anticipated so that leveraged firms possibly require
credit from the banks in order to finance production: firms’ liabilities towards
banks define a third, financial, network linking firms and banks.
Our representation of the firm is built upon two fundamental features: firms
are equity constrained (see Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993) and adaptive price
setters (see Gintis, 2007). As demonstrated in the recent literature on financial
fragility (e.g Battiston et al., 2007; Delli Gatti et al., 2010), accounting for imper-
fect markets and financial constraints is key to understand the genesis of the fi-
nancial network and the spreading of shocks in the economy through bankruptcy
cascades and, more generally, financial accelerator mechanisms. Recognizing the
adaptive nature of decision making and the decentralized nature of prices allows
to develop micro-founded approaches of out-of-equilibrium dynamics (see Gin-
tis and Mandel, 2012). Combining both insights allows to situate the literature
on economic fragility vis-a`-vis the standard general equilibrium framework and
in particular to demonstrate that the propagation of shocks and volatility are
essentially out-of-equilibria phenomena.
In order to perform this comparison, we root our model in a standard
Cobb-Douglas technological infrastructure, identical to these in which Long and
Plosser (1983) develop their real business cycle model and Acemoglu et al. (2012)
perform their equilibrium analysis of the decay of shocks in production networks.
Namely, firms are grouped in N distinct sectors producing homogeneous goods.
The production possibilities of firms in sector g are described by a production
function Fg : R
N+1
+ → R+, such that:
Fg(lg, xg) = γgl
αg
g
N∏
h=1
x
(1−αg)wg,h
g,h (1)
where the parameters γg > 0, αg ∈]0, 1[ and wg,h ≥ 0 respectively represent
productivity, the share of labor and the share of good h in the total interme-
diate input use of firms in sector g while the variables lg and xg,h respectively
correspond to the amount of labor hired and the amount of commodity h used
in the production process. The coefficient wg,h can be related to the entry of
an input-output table measuring the value of spending on input h per dollar of
production of good g.
Each household inelastically supplies a unit of labor. Whenever individ-
ual preferences have to be introduced, in order to ensure comparability with
the equilibrium literature, we shall assume that individual are characterized by
5
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utility functions of the form
u(c1, · · · , cN ) =
N∏
h=1
cvhh
where the variable ch stands for the consumption of good g and the parameter
vh empirically corresponds to the share of expenses devoted to good h.
We will consider there is the same finite numberM ∈ N of households and of
firms in each sector2 and denote the economy by E(M,N,α, γ, ω, v), the set of
goods, by G = {1, · · · , N}, the set of firms by F = {(g, j) | g ∈ G, j ∈ {1, · · ·M}}
and the set of households by H = {1, · · · ,M}.
2.2 The State Space
In order to extend the static results of Acemoglu et al. (2012) on the decay
of aggregate volatility and to clarify the relationships between the agent-based
financial fragility literature (see Battiston et al., 2007; Delli Gatti et al., 2010)
and general equilibrium, we undertake an exploration of out-of-equilibrium dy-
namics in this economy.
In order to accurately account for financial interactions, we shall introduceM
financial agents or banks whose set is denoted by B. Bank k will be characterized
throughout by a level of net worth ak, corresponding to its financial capital .
Two key state variables will govern the behavior of firms and households: a
private vector of prices and a level of net worth. More precisely, we will denote
by pg,j ∈ RN+ and ag,j ∈ R+ (resp pi ∈ RN+ and ai ∈ R+) the private price and
the net worth of the jth firm3 in sector g (resp. of the ith household) and let
(p, a) ∈ P × A := (RN+ )(N+1)M × (R+)(N+2)M denote the complete state of the
system (it also includes the net worths of banks).
The private price for good h of firm (g, j) (resp. of the ith household),
pg,j,h (resp. pi,h), is a reserve price, the maximum price the firm (resp. the
household) is willing to pay for that good. The private price of firm (g, j)
for its own good, pg,j,g, is its actual selling price. On top of being an accurate
representation of the fact that firms actually are price setters, private prices have
good asymptotic properties in terms of convergence to general equilibrium when
updated according to evolutionary dynamics, see Gintis and Mandel (2012).
The net worths of households correspond to cash holdings to be spent on
consumption. The net worth of firm (g, j), ag,j , represents the amount of fi-
nancial capital it can autonomously employ in the production process. In line
with the idea of having credit-constrained firms a` la Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1993), we use financial capital as a measure of the firm’s financial robustness
and determine accordingly the extent of a firm’s access to credit and hence
its production capacity. Namely, we shall assume following previous work by
2The number of firms per sector and of households is set identically to simplify the expo-
sition and the normalization of variables
3Firm (g, j) hereafter.
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Delli Gatti and al., that the production capacity of firm (g, j) is given by the
financially constrained output function:
f(ag,j) = φa
β
g,j (2)
where ag,j ∈ R+ is the net worth the firm holds, φ > 1, and 0 < β < 1. The
parameters φ and β condition the intensity at which capital is put in motion
in the economy. More precisely, β measures the extent to which there are
“decreasing returns” to financial robustness in terms of credit leverage, and
eventually production, it can yield. These parameters also implicitly define the
time-scale of the model through the production to capital ratio.
The initial monetary mass in the model consists in the sum of the net worths
of banks, firms and households. Permanent addition to the monetary mass can
occur at runtime in case a bank goes bankrupt (see below).
2.3 Initialization and transition
Initialization of the model consists in the choice of an initial value for the net
worth and private prices of each agent, i.e of an element (p0, a0) ∈ P × A :=
(RN+ )
(N+1)M × (R+)(N+2)M . Then, every period the following operations take
place sequentially:
• Real Step. The quantities of goods produced, exchanged and consumed
are determined as a function of net worths and private prices.
• Financial Step. The evolution of agents’ net worths are determined, on
the one hand by the outcome of the production and exchange processes
and on the other hand by the inflows and outflows of money between the
productive and the financial sector induced by the credit scheme according
to which production is financed. At this stage, firms and banks can go
bankrupt if their net worth becomes negative. New firms and banks are
then funded from existing capital in the financial sector.
• Price Step. The evolution of agents’ private prices is determined according
to stochastic evolutionary dynamics that use as measures of fitness the
profit of firms and the utility of households.
A time step of the model hence consists in the sequential application of the
real, financial and price steps. It returns updated values on one hand for the net
worth and private prices of each agent and on the other hand for the economic
variables (production, consumption, profits,...) that have been correlatively
determined. Our actual assumptions about economic dynamics are embedded
within the description of each of these steps that is given below.
2.4 Real Dynamics
In order to capture the dynamic interactions between prices, quantities, and
credit conditions, we must first specify how a private price and net worth profile
7
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(p, a) ∈ P × A determines the level of production and its allocation in the
economy. In agent-based models, (e.g Dosi et al., 2010; Dawid et al., 2012;
Wolf et al., 2013; Mandel, 2012), this process is generally emerging from a very
detailed representation of the firms’ decisions and of their interactions on the
different markets. We consider that our analysis can abstract away from part
of these details as the time-scale at which they matter is below this that is
of concern when one focuses on aggregate volatility and equilibration. This
perspective on time-scales is akin to this of subscale parametrization used in
climate modeling (see Edwards, 2010).
We shall also consider as a first approximation that production and allocation
of goods take place in a frictionless 4 way given the constraints implied by
the compatibility of private prices and the financial capacity. Finally, we shall
assume the agents are “computationally” rational in the sense that they are able
to perform cost minimization operations. These assumptions yield the following
representation of the production and allocation processes.
Firms use the input mix that minimizes production costs according to their
private prices. That is firm (g, j) uses an input combination proportional to
(µg,j , νg,j) := argminFg(lg,xg)=1 pg,jxg + wlg where w is the unit labor cost.
Hence firm (g, j) uses µg,j units of labor and a vector νg,j of goods per unit of
output produced.
Households choose their preferred input mix given their private prices. That
is household i consumes proportionally to γi := argmaxpi·xi≤1 ui(xi). In other
words, household i will consume γi,h units of good h for every unit of income
spent.
Let us then denote by z(g,j),(g′,j′) the flow of good g from firm (g, j) to firm
(g′, j′), z(g,j),i the flow of good g from firm (g, j) to household i, zi,(g,j) the
flow of labor from household i to firm (g, j), lg,j the quantity of labor employed
by firm (g, j), xg,j,g′ the quantity of good g
′ used as input by firm (g, j), xi,g′
the quantity of good g′ consumed by household i, yg,j the quantity of output
produced by firm (g, j) and wi the income of household i.
We shall assume that the production and allocation processes are efficient
in the sense that the maximal share of aggregate demand for each good is ful-
filled5 under the constraints that agents only trade with peers using compatible
prices (i and ii below), labor and goods are conserved during exchanges (iii to
vi), production satisfies the technological (vii) and financial (viii) constraints,
consumption satisfies the budget constraints (ix and x). That is production,
consumption, labor and goods’ flows are determined as a solution of the follow-
ing maximization problem.
4It would be straightforward to introduce frictions in the process, e.g by considering that
a certain share of production dissipates instead of being consumed. It seems reasonable to
focus first on the frictionless case and to delay generalization to further work.
5More precisely we maximize the minimal ratio of consumption to demand among goods.
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

max ming∈G
∑M
i=1 xi,g∑M
i=1 γi,g
s.t
(i) ∀(g, j), (g′, j′) ∈ F , z(g,j),(g′,j′) > 0⇒ pg,j,g ≤ pg′,j′,g
(ii) ∀(g, j),∈ F , ∀i ∈ H z(g,j),i > 0⇒ pg,j,g ≤ pi,g
(iii) ∀(g, j) ∈ F , lg,j =
∑
i∈H zi,(g,j)
(iv) ∀(g, j) ∈ F , ∀g′ ∈ G xg,j,g′ =
∑
{j′|(g′,j′)∈F} z(g′,j′),(g,j)
(v) ∀(i) ∈ H, ∀g ∈ G xi,g =
∑
{j|(g,j)∈F} z(g,j),i
(vi) ∀(g, j) ∈ F , ∑{(g′,j′)∈F} z(g,j),(g′,j′) +∑{i∈H} z(g,j),i ≤ yg,j
(vii) ∀(g, j) ∈ F , yg,j ≤ Fg(lg,j , xg,j)
(viii) ∀(g, j) ∈ F , yg,j ≤ f(ag,j)
(ix) ∀i ∈ H, wi = λw
∑
{(g,j)∈F} zi,(g,j)
(x) ∀i ∈ H, ∀g ∈ G, xi,g ≤ (wi + ai)γi,g
(3)
Hence production, income and consumption are completely determined by
the profile of private prices and net worth (p, a) ∈ P × A. These being given,
the economy functions in an “efficient” way in the sense that as large a share as
possible of the final demand is fulfilled given the financial and price compatibil-
ity constraints. However, there are two potentially major sources of inefficiency
related respectively to prices and to the distribution of financial capital. Con-
cerning prices they might be dispersed, hence preventing trading, or they might
be away from their equilibrium values, what leads to rationing, misallocation of
goods, abnormal profits and losses and eventually bankruptcies. Note in partic-
ular that unless agents all use the same equilibrium price, supply and demand
can’t balance exactly and hence constraints (vi) and (vii) can’t bind simultane-
ously: there must be excess supply or inefficient use of inputs. Both can trigger
losses. Concerning financial capital, it might be misallocated, what leads to ca-
pacity shortage and rationing in certain sectors and to capacity underutilization
in others.
Though it is standard in economic theory to focus on equilibrium situations
only, it is necessary here to introduce explicitly out-of-equilibrium trading as we
focus on the (possible) emergence of equilibrium (see Fisher, 1989). Considera-
tion of such disequilibrium situations is standard in agent-based models, which
aim at dynamical completeness (see LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008). Alterna-
tively, our model can also be viewed as a concrete implementation of disequilib-
rium/temporary equilibrium theories a` la Benassy-Grandmont (see Grandmont,
1988; Be´nassy, 2005). In any case, it shall be made clear that our approach is
not inconsistent with the law of one price nor with the notion that economic
agents are price-takers under perfect competition as both of these conditions
can be obtained as long-run properties of our model (in the equilibrium regime
described below).
Remark 1 The cost of labor w is fixed and used as a numeraire throughout
the paper. However the labor cost differs from the wage actually paid upfront
9
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to employees in exchange of labor. The actual wage is set equal to λw where
λ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter representing approximately the share of labor in the
value added. The remaining of the labor cost (1− λ)w is the surplus that shall
accrue to the owner/entrepreneur of the firm in case the production is actually
profitable (see subsection 2.5.3 below) and be spent on consumption next period.
2.5 Financial Dynamics
2.5.1 Credits and Interests
The financial counterparts of the production and exchange processes are deter-
mined by the magnitude of these exchanges as well as by the scheme according
to which they are financed. We shall consider here a setting a` la Delli Gatti
et al. (2010), which account both for commercial credit between firms and fi-
nancial credit extended to firms by banks. Namely, we shall assume that sales
of productive inputs are financed by a commercial credit extended by the seller
to the buyer while wages are anticipated (i.e paid cash by the firms) and the
excess of the wage bill over the net worth of the firm is financed by a credit
extended by its bank to the firm (For each g ∈ G, firm (g, j) is initially linked to
bank j ; the dynamics of the financial network are specified in subsection 2.6.1).
Following Delli Gatti et al. (2010), we consider the interest rates on both
commercial and financial credit are increasing with the financial soundness (i.e
the net worth) of the lender and decreasing with the leverage (i.e the ratio
between the level of debt and the net worth) of the borrower. More precisely
the interest rate charged by lender ℓ (be it a bank or a firm ) to borrower/firm
(g, j) is:
rℓ,(g,j) = ρa
−ρ
ℓ + ρ
(
dg,j
ag,j
)ρ
where the parameter ρ ∈ R+ controls the sensitivity of the interest rate (see
Delli Gatti et al., 2010, for details). The debt of firm (g, j), dg,j ∈ R refers to
the total debt computed as:
dg,j := −ag,j + wlg,j +
∑
{(g′,j′)∈F}
pg′,j′,g′z(g′,j′),(g,j).
2.5.2 Clearing
After production and allocation operations have taken place, the financial status
of a firm (g, j) is given by:
• Its net worth updated by wage payments in cash to households and cash
payments of consumption by households during the period. That is the
updated net worth of firm g, j is given by:
ag,j = ag,j − wlg,j +
∑
i∈H
pg,j,gz(g,j),i
where ag,j refers to the value of ag,j at the beginning of the period.
10
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• Its liabilities towards other firms, which consist in the commercial credit
it has been granted plus interest payments. That is the debt of firm (g, j)
towards firm (g′, j′) is given by:
d(g,j),(g′,j′) := (1 + r(g′,j′),(g,j))pg′,j′,g′z(g′,j′),(g,j)
• Its liabilities towards its bank, which consist in the credit it has been
granted to finance its wage bill plus the interest payments. Namely, the
debt of firm (g, j) towards its bank k is given by:
d(g,j),k := (1 + rk,(g,j))d(g,j),k
where the principal of the debt is given by
d(g,j),k = λwlg,j − ag,j
Debts are then cleared by compensation. If complete clearing is impossible
because of default, that is if there are firms for which the value of liabilities
excess this of assets (net worth plus debts from other firms), defaulting firms
are bankrupted/liquidated and their assets shared uniformly among creditors.
More precisely, the following clearing algorithm is implemented.
1. If for all (g, j) ∈ F , one has:
ag,j +
∑
{(g′,j′)∈F}
d(g′,j′),(g,j) ≥
∑
{(g′,j′)∈F}
d(g,j),(g′,j′) +
∑
{k∈B}
d(g,j),k
then all the debts can be cleared by having each firm (g, j) adding to its
financial capital ag,j a net transfer of
∑
{(g′,j′)∈F}
d(g′,j′),(g,j) −
∑
{(g′,j′)∈F}
d(g,j),(g′,j′) −
∑
{k∈B}
d(g,j),k
and each bank k adding to its financial capital ak a net transfer of
∑
{(g′,j′)∈F}
d(g′,j′),k −
∑
{(g′,j′)∈F}
d(g′,j′),k.
2. Otherwise, each firm (g0, j0) ∈ F such that the condition 1. above does not
hold goes bankrupt. Its assets are allocated to its creditors proportionally
to the amount of outstanding debt. That is, the net worth and the claims
of each firm and bank are updated as follows (the symbol + = denotes an
incrementation, that is the variable on the left-hand side is updated by
adding the value of the expression on the right-hand side):
For all ℓ ∈ F ∪ B/{(g0, j0)} :
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

aℓ +=
d(g0,j0),ℓ∑
{(g′,j′)∈F} d(g0,j0),(g′,j′) +
∑
{k∈B} d(g0,j0),k)
ag0,j0
∀(g′, j′) ∈ F ,
d(g′,j′),ℓ +=
d(g0,j0),ℓ∑
{(g′,j′)∈F} d(g0,j0),(g′,j′) +
∑
{k∈B} d(g0,j0),k)
d(g′,j′),(g0,j0)
For (g0, j0) :


a(g0,j0) := 0
∀(g′, j′) ∈ F ,
d(g′,j′),(g0,j0) := 0
3. 1. and 2. are repeated until all firms are sound in the sense of 1.
It is relatively easy to check that this algorithm stops after a finite number of
iterations as there is at least one bankruptcy per (non-terminal) iteration and
at most N ×M firms can go bankrupt. Note also that each creditor is treated
in a purely symmetric manner but possibly for the order according to which
bankrupted firms are litigated, and this latter point does not affect the outcome
of the algorithm (see Eisenberg and Noe, 2001).
A key implication of the presence of commercial credit in the model and
of the clearing mechanism is that the actual/financial profit of the firm does
not only depend on its commercial performance, which it can “control” through
its pricing policy, but also on the financial soundness of its partners, through
which it is in fact exposed to the whole credit network. Indeed the debt clearing
mechanism can propagate default far away from its source. The firm is hence
exposed to a systemic risk whose manifestations appear as random (at least
from the firm’s point of view). The only influence the firm has on this risk
is through the interest rate it charges. However, because of systemic effects,
the idea of mitigating risk by a higher interest rate might be self-deceiving (see
Battiston et al., 2012a).
2.5.3 Accounting and financial flows
Actual/financial profits of firms are computed as the net increase in wealth
after the clearing of debts. Profits might differ from the value of sales minus
production costs because some of the firm’s creditors might have gone bankrupt
and default on their commercial debt. Part of these profits are retained by
the firm in order to increase its financial capital, part are distributed to the
household sector. More precisely, for each g = 1 · · ·N and each j = 1 · · ·M,
firm (g, j) distributes to household j a dividend equal to the minimum between
its financial profit and (1− λ) times its value added, that is:
min(ag,j − ag,j , (1− λ)(pg,jyg,j −
N∑
h=1
M∑
k=1
ph,kz(h,k),(g,j)))
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The remaining share of the profit is retained in the firm’s capital. As far as the
banks are concerned they retain all their profits.
As far as losses are concerned, they are covered by the financial capital of the
agents (see clearing algorithm above) until the losses excess the financial capital
available, in which case the corresponding agent goes bankrupt. The bankrupted
firms are determined during the clearing algorithm. The bankrupt banks are
those whose financial capital becomes negative after the clearing algorithm, that
is banks k such that ak < 0. Note that when a bank goes bankrupt, the amount
of its outstanding deficit has already passed into the general circulation (it was
used to pay wages) and given that we do not represent the interbank clearing
system, the loss can’t be affected to a counterpart so that the monetary mass
increases of the corresponding amount. Each bankrupted firm and bank is then
replaced by a new entrant that is capitalized as follows.
• For each new firm, a bank is drawn at random to capitalize it. The new
capital of the firm is set equal to to the minimum between half the bank’s
capital and the mean wealth of firms in the economy. The correspond-
ing amount is subtracted from the capital of the bank that finance the
capitalization.
• For each new bank, another bank is drawn at random to capitalize it. The
outstanding deficit is foregone and the target new capital of the bank is
drawn uniformly at random in [0, 2] (so that the expected capital of a newly
funded bank is one). However, as for the firms, the actual capitalization
can not exceed half the capital of the bank financing the operation.
These assumptions correspond to an institutional setting in which firms are
managed by entrepreneurial households and owned by banks. The managers
capture part of the profit (the part that is distributed), the other part is saved by
banks within the firm’s capital. The assumption that each household manages
the same number of firm (he receives compensation from all firms whose index
is the same as his, see above) is certainly over-simplistic but the distribution
of wealth among households shall have little impact on the dynamics of our
model given that consumption behavior is independent of the level of income
(see subsection 2.4). The assumption that firms are owned by banks rather than
by households is consistent with the fact that there are no motives nor means
for savings in a setting where there is no capital accumulation and the only
financial assets are intra-period loans. As a matter of fact, in absence of capital
accumulation, aggregate budgetary balance implies that all income should be
spent on consumption.
The bankruptcy rules for firms are such that the monetary mass is conserved
and hence the model is stock-flow consistent with the caveat that whenever a
bank goes bankrupt, the amount of its outstanding deficit yields a net mone-
tary creation of the same amount. The aggregate flows of capital between the
productive and the financial sectors are determined by the level of debt and
interests and by the financial fragility of the system. On the one hand, interests
payments induce a transfer of capital from the productive to the financial sector.
13
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On the other hand, default and recapitalization of firms following bankruptcies
induce a net transfer from the financial to the productive sector.
In this setting, the key feature characterizing the financial system is the speed
and the magnitude at which it can exchange capital with the productive sectors.
This will be mainly determined by the total capital in the financial sector and
the distribution of wealth in the productive sector (see next section). In many
other respects, our representation of the financial system is over-simplistic. In
particular, the capital of banks is here more of a buffer than a truly operative
variable. For example, leverage of banks is unbounded in our setting (banks’
capital only affects the interest rate) and the only rationale for banks to invest
in firms are capital gains (they never receive dividends) although we lack the
representation of the market for firms’ stocks.
2.6 Price Dynamics
Our representation of prices’ dynamics is in line with the core assumptions in
general equilibrium theory that firms are profit maximizers and households are
utility maximizers. Yet, our approach is more behavioral, in the sense that we
consider that this optimization takes place adaptively through stochastic evolu-
tionary process in which firms update their competitiveness and their profitabil-
ity through their private prices and households update their consumption plan
through a monetary evaluation again based on their private prices. It turns out
that this approach has much better dynamical properties than the Walrasian
taˆtonnement (see Gintis and Mandel, 2012).
Stochastic evolutionary processes are based on a measure of fitness that
determine which strategies get imitated and which disappear. In our case, the
fitness of an household is computed during consumption operations as the ratio
between utility and income. The fitness of a firm is computed after commercial
credit clearing as the ratio between the profit and the net worth at the beginning
of the period (i.e return on equity). Agents are then pooled according to their
types: all households together and producers by sectors. There are N + 1 such
pools, each consisting of m = 1 · · ·M agents characterized by a fitness fm and
a private price pm. Prices are updated independently for each pool of agents
according to the following algorithm (from Gintis, 2007).
1. Normalized fitness fm are computed according to fm =
fm − fmin
fmax − fmin .
2. Until a fraction τcopy of agents have been selected as imitators, an agent
is drawn at random and selected as an imitator with probability 1− fm.
Similarly, until a fraction τcopy of agents have been selected as models, an
agent is drawn at random and selected as a model with probability fm.
3. Each imitator is randomly paired with a model and copies its private price.
That is the imitator m, if paired with the model m′, sets the value of its
private price to pm′ ,
14
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Then prices mutate (see again Gintis, 2007), that is τmutate agents are ran-
domly drawn and independently for each good divide or multiply (each with
probability one half) their price by a factor µ. That is if pk,g is the private
price of good g for agent k before mutation, the mutation turns it to µpk,g with
probability
1
2
and to
pk,g
µ
with probability
1
2
. Eventually, each firm checks the
consistency of its prices by ensuring its selling price is at least equal to its unit
production cost.
Mutations might account for errors in the imitation process or random in-
novation. Their structural importance comes from the fact that they make the
evolutionary process ergodic.
2.6.1 Dynamics of the financial network
For each g ∈ G, firm (g, j) is initially linked to bank j. The dynamics of the
financial network are identical to those in Delli Gatti et al. (2010). In every
period, after accounting took place, each firm observes the interest rates offered
by a randomly selected sample of 30% of the population of banks. If the interest
rate rold offered by the current bank is less than the minimum interest rate rnew
offered in the sample of banks observed, the firm sticks to its current bank.
Otherwise, with probability 1−e
rnew − rold
rnew the firm shifts to the bank offering
the interest rate rnew.
2.7 Simulation setting
We investigate the dynamics of the model via numerical simulations. A period
of the model corresponds to the sequential execution of the real, financial and
price steps and a simulation corresponds to the iteration of the model for a
finite number of periods. The model is implemented in Matlab and the linear
program in subsection (2.4) is solved using IBM ilog cplex optimization studio6.
The default parameters for simulations are reported in table 1. Some remarks
about the relation between simulation and the nature of the dynamics are also
in order at this stage.
• The real step is formally non-deterministic as it involves picking-up a
solution to the linear program in subsection (2.4) that can a priori admit
many such solutions. Yet, our implementation is deterministic as long as
the behavior of the optimization algorithms we use are. This shall be the
case7.
• The financial step is deterministic.
6Made freely available for academic use by IBM. This IBM academic initiative is gratefully
acknowledged.
7According to the software provider: see CPLEX user’s manual on Advanced programming
techniques/Parallel optimizers/Determinism of results
15
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.76
• The price step is stochastic but is implemented on the basis of a pseudo-
random number generator in order to ensure reproducibility of results.
Symbol Interpretation Default value
N nb. of sectors 3
M nb. of agents per sector 50
γ productivity parameter 2N
α share of labor in production 0.5
ω input-output table ∀g, g′ ∈ G, ωg,g′ = 1
N
v expenditure shares ∀g,∈ G, vg, = 1
N
λ share of labor in value-added 0.95
φ magnitude of leverage 2
β returns to financial robustness 0.9
ρ interest rate parameter 0.015
τcopy price imitation rate 0.25
τmutate price mutation rate 0.05
µ mutation factor 0.1
Table 1: simulations’ default parameters
3 General equilibrium and financial fragility.
The general equilibrium of the economy E(M,N,α, γ, ω, v) will play a central
role in our analysis as most of our results are stated vis-a`-vis this equilibrium:
convergence to equilibrium, mean residence time in or away of equilibrium,
effects of the structure of the production network or of financial constraints
on equilibrium. It is therefore fundamental to characterize equilibrium in our
model: both analytically and as a reference point of the dynamics of simulations.
3.1 Analytic derivation of equilibrium
Analytically, an equilibrium of the economy E(M,N,α, γ, ω, v) is any collection
of prices p∗ ∈ RN+ , labor cost w∗ ∈ R+, consumption (x∗i )i=1,··· ,M ∈ RN×M+ and
production plans (l∗g,j , y
∗
g,j)g=1,··· ,N,j=1,··· ,M ∈ (R+ × RN+ )N×M+ such that:
1. For all i = 1 · · ·M, household i maximizes utility:
x∗i := argmaxp∗
i
···xi≤w∗ui(xi)
2. For all g = 1 · · ·N, j = 1 · · ·M, firm (g, j) maximizes profit:
y∗g,j := argmaxFg(lg,j ,yg,j,−g)=yg,j,gp
∗
g · yg,j,g − p∗−g · yg,j,−g − w∗lg,j
.
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3. Good markets clear:
M∑
g=1
N∑
j=1
y∗g,j =
M∑
i=1
x∗i
4. Labor market clears
M∑
g=1
N∑
j=1
l∗g,j = M
Once labor is defined as the nume´raire and has its price fixed8 it is straight-
forward to show that the equilibrium of this economy is unique up to the allo-
cation of production among firms. In particular there is a unique equilibrium
price for goods, p∗ such that9:
log(p∗) = (Id− ω)−1

 − log(γ1)− α1 log(α1)−
∑N
h=1 log(w1,h)
. . .
− log(γ1)− α1 log(α1)−
∑N
h=1 log(wN,h)


Therefrom, one can compute the equilibrium consumption of each household and
the equilibrium production aggregated at the sectoral level. However, as there
are constant returns to scale, profit maximization yields zero profits. Hence the
firm can only determine an optimal input mix, not an optimal production level,
on the basis of prices. In this sense, coordination through prices is incomplete
and the equilibrium is indeterminate.
3.2 Financial viability and Equilibrium
In our setting, indeterminacy on the firm’s production level is reduced thanks
to the financially constrained output function, which provides a cap on the
production level of each firm. It is then a matter of basic accounting to realize
that general equilibrium and financial stability are intrinsically linked. Indeed,
unless there is a permanent inflow of money from the financial sector to the
productive ones, the total financial capital held by firms must remain constant
if production is to be sustained.
In a setting with constant returns, at a general equilibrium aggregate profits
shall be zero in each sector, so that the financial capital and the production
capacity shall remain constant. Hence, the equilibrium production and con-
sumption as well as the corresponding distribution of financial capital can be
reproduced period after period without additional inputs. Therefore, the gen-
eral equilibrium shall be a viable state of our dynamical system that induces
stability of both the financial and the real spheres.
Away from equilibrium, a sector that makes positive profits sees his produc-
tion capacity growing. Now, in absence of financial inflows from the financial to
8As a matter of fact, we set the labor cost in such a way that the mean price of commodities
equals one at equilibrium
9We denote by Id the identity matrix of size n. A detailed derivation is given in the
appendix of Acemoglu et al. (2012).
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the production sphere, the profits of a sector are the losses of another. Hence
the counterpart of these out-of-equilibrium profits shall be out-of-equilibrium
losses in another sector whose production capacity must then shrink. Given the
sectoral interdependencies in the production structure, such a situation isn’t
viable as the shrinking of the unprofitable sector would eventually yield some
rationing of the profitable one and a general decrease of production. The only
ways forward are technological innovation (that we do not consider here) or in-
flow of additional financial capital, i.e the built-up of further leverage. In other
words, disequilibrium is for us a symptom of financial fragility.
We will further analyze these relationships between real and financial insta-
bility below, but our initial inquiry is wether an economy can self-organize into a
viable equilibrium state. That is, do economic agents’ reaction to disequilibrium
such as price or capacity changes, form a strong enough feedback mechanism to
induce the convergence of the system towards equilibrium? A positive answer
to this question is implicitly assumed in most of the existing economic theory.
Previous simulation and analytical results of ours (see respectively Gintis (2007)
and Gintis and Mandel (2012)) suggest that in a setting where competition is
actually implemented through private updating of prices, evolutionary dynamics
do lead the system to equilibrium. Here, the issue is revisited in a more realistic
setting with intermediary production and financial constraints. It turns out that
financial constraints actually matter. More precisely the stability of equilibrium
and the dynamical regime crucially depend on the relative strength of resource
and financial constraints. When the resource (labor) constraints dominate, the
economy efficiently plays its role of allocation of a scarce resource and equilib-
rium prevails. When financial constraints dominate, financial fragility is the key
driver of the dynamics.
3.3 Convergence properties
Resources constraints in our economy are determined by the labor supply. In-
deed, in absence of technological innovation, labor supply defines an upper
bound on the aggregate production throughout time.
Conversely, given the leverage parameters φ and β, the financial constraints
are defined by the initial wealth of firms and banks a0 ∈ A. These determine on
the one hand, the initial monetary mass and the initial production capacity. On
the other hand, they will affect the capital of firms and banks created at runtime.
Hence, they will determine the potential inflow of money in the production sector
during a period (see section 2.5.3).
When these financial constraints are weak, i.e when the stock and the poten-
tial inflow of capital in the economy is large with respect to the labor resources,
the model has very robust properties of convergence to equilibrium. To illus-
trate this point, we first consider a version of the model with three productive
sectors (N = 3), fifty agents per sector (M = 50), and the remaining parameters
set as in table 1. In this setting, the equilibrium price is equal to 1 for every
good and the aggregate equilibrium production (resp. consumption) level is 100
(resp. 50). We initialize the model by drawing each price uniformly at random
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in [0, 2], allocating an initial wealth of 1 to each firm and of 100 to each bank.
Then, resource constraints dominate as the equilibrium production level (100
units) is much less than what firms can finance without recourse to credit (300
units). Hence, as illustrated in the right panel of figure 1, total credit outstand-
ing is negligible meaning that wages are mainly financed by firms’ net worth.
Constraints on credit would anyhow be very weak: initial capital of banks is
much greater than the recurrent financing needs of the production sector.
In this economy, the dynamics of the model are very clearcut: in about
hundred periods, the mean private price of firms converges to its equilibrium
value and the standard deviation of the price among firms become negligible (see
figure 2) It is also the case that aggregate production and consumption reach
their equilibrium values and that demand and supply balance each other (see
left panel of figure 1). Hence the economy reaches equilibrium in approximately
hundred periods and rests there for the remaining of the simulation.
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(a) Aggregate Demand (final plus intermedi-
ary), Aggregate Consumption and Supply
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(b) total credit to firms
Figure 1: Markets
To provide a quantitative assessment of the convergence properties of the
model, we perform 250 Monte-Carlo simulations where we let the number of
sectors vary from 2 to 6 and randomly draw 50 distinct production networks
(the other parameters being set as in table 1). To assess the results of these
simulations, we use a concept of approximate equilibrium. We shall say that
the model is in an ǫ-equilibrium in period t if:
1. The euclidian distance between the mean selling price and the equilibrium
price is less than ǫ;
2. The standard deviation of prices is less than ǫ;
3. The excess demand (i.e total production minus total consumption minus
total intermediary consumption as determined in 2.4. ) is less than ǫ times
the total production.
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(a) Mean of prices
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Figure 2: Prices
indicator\nb of sectors 2 3 4 5 6 mean
mean nb of ǫ-equilibria in periods 1-500 431 324 267 265 184 294
mean nb of ǫ-equilibria in periods 100-500 384 314 261 262 184 281
mean nb of ǫ-equilibria in periods 400-500 97 82 67 79 62 78
Table 2: nb of periods in equilibrium
We then measure for the 250 Monte-Carlo simulations the mean number of
periods in which the model is in an ǫ-equilibrium (with ǫ = 0.1). The results are
reported in table 2. Though the convergence time increases with the number of
sectors, the model shows very robust properties of convergence to equilibrium.
In the last 100 periods of the simulation, the model spends in average 80% of
the time in equilibrium and for small number of sectors, the model is almost
always in equilibrium.
Hence, we do obtain converge to equilibrium when resource constraints dom-
inate. The small source of volatility introduced by the random mutations in
the price formation process do not get amplified into aggregate volatility nor
fragility. These good convergence properties are a first contribution of the
model: we extend to an economy with intermediary production, the results
of Gintis (2007) about the convergence to general equilibrium of private prices
under evolutionary dynamics. It is worth noting in this respect that the intro-
duction of efficient dynamics for the allocation of goods in 2.4 is perfectly in line
with the axiomatic characterization of exchange processes inducing evolutionary
stability of equilibrium obtained in Gintis and Mandel (2012).
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3.4 Disequilibrium and financial fragility
The previous picture of economic equilibrium and financial stability seems at
odds with the results reported in Delli Gatti et al. (2010) where “prices are
important determinants of profits, which in turn affect the accumulation of net
worth and financial fragility. The financial vulnerability of an agent therefore is
affected by the dynamics of prices.”
Yet, the economic environment considered in Delli Gatti et al. (2010) is
a particular case of ours with two sectors and intermediary consumption by
the second sector only, something that corresponds to α1 = 1, α2 = 0.5 and
ω =
(
0 0
1 0
)
. The dynamics we consider are also very similar to these of
Delli Gatti et al. (2010) but for the evolution of prices, which is purely random
and exogenous in Delli Gatti et al. (2010) while it is endogenous and directed by
evolutionary learning in our case. It is also the case that the sales of produced
quantities at a purely random price in Delli Gatti et al. (2010) induce net inflows
or outflows of money in the economy, whereas our model is stock-flow consistent
as final consumption is entirely financed by wages and dividends.
One could therefore claim that it is the lack of stock-flow consistency and
the exogenously imposed price volatility that induces financial fragility, network-
based financial accelerator mechanisms, bankruptcy avalanches and aggregate
volatility in Delli Gatti et al. (2010). We shall show this is not the case.
Indeed, even small shocks on the the price system induce variation in sales
and profits and eventually of firms’ net worths. As soon as the financial con-
straints are binding, downward variations in net worths lead to a decrease of
productive capacity. Decreased capacity in turn lowers the competitive pressure,
so that prices start leaving the equilibrium paths. Rationing and losses follow,
financial fragility increases and the way is paved for bankruptcy avalanches a` la
Delli Gatti et al. (2010).
In order to illustrate, the processes at play, we consider a three-sector version
of the model with parameters set as in table 1 but where the initial net worths
of firms is set equal to 0.25 and this of banks equal to 2 (recall that these values
also condition the capital of firms and banks created at runtime and hence
the potential inflow of capital into the system). This economy is financially
constrained, on the one hand because the aggregate production the firms can
self-finance (75 units) is less than the equilibrium production (100 units) and
on the other hand because the additional capital the banks can provide to the
productive sector is also very limited. Indeed, as underlined in section 2.5.3, the
only source of increase of the aggregate capital of the productive sector is the
funding of new firms and the write-off of the claims on bankrupt firms, which
are both financed by the banks.
As illustrated in figures 3 and 4, the first hundred periods of the simulation
are rather similar to the ones leading to equilibrium in section 3.3. A slight
difference being that in the very first periods, a series of bankruptcies induce
a massive transfer of capital from the financial to the productive sector (see
figure 5). It then seems that the productive sector reaches a level of capital
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Figure 3: Markets
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
 
 
Mean sell price 1
Mean sell price 2
Mean sell price 3
(a) Mean of prices
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
 
 
StdDev price 1
StdDev price 2
StdDev price 3
(b) Standard deviation of prices
Figure 4: Prices
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Figure 5: Finance
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compatible with the equilibrium production level. Yet this high capitalization
is unsustainable as it is out of proportion with the financing flow that the
financial sector can maintain towards the productive sector (see the right panel
in figure 5). As a matter of fact, a shock to the price system around period 100
(see figure 4, most notably the right panel) triggers a temporary increase of the
mean and of the standard deviation of the price of good 1, which induces a drop
in demand (see figure 3) in sales, in profits and eventually in the net worth and
productive capacity of firms (see figure 6). Observing figure 5, one can remark
that this loss of financial capital in the production sector is not compensated by
a sizable inflow of capital from the financial to the production sector ; quite the
contrary, the total net worth of banks is increasing. This is due to the fact that,
as in Delli Gatti et al. (2010), the distribution of wealth among firms evolves
during the simulation (see the evolution of the coefficient of variation in figure
6) and becomes much more dispersed. Larger firms face losses without going
bankrupt and hence these losses aren’t passed to the financial sector (as it was
the case at the beginning of the simulation when the size distribution of firms
was uniform). Hence productive capacity does not recover, competition becomes
less stringent and prices exit the equilibrium paths (see figure 4 from period 100
and onwards). As underlined in section 3.2, out-of-equilibrium, financial losses
become structural. Consequently, the wealth of firm further decreases, interest
rates increase with the financial fragility of borrowers (see figure 7) and a positive
feedback loop ensues which eventually leeds to a bankruptcy avalanche around
period 170 (see figure 5).
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Figure 6: Firms’ wealth
The mechanisms at play are very similar to these described in Delli Gatti
et al. (2010) “The bankruptcy of a borrower creates a negative externality because
the bad debt recorded on the lender’s balance sheet yields an increase of the
interest rate charged to all the other borrowers. This is the starting point of
the financial accelerator. If the surviving borrowers experience an increase of
leverage due to the interest rate hike, the lender will react by raising the interest
rate even further. Financial fragility will spread to the neighborhood and may
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Figure 7: Prices
spill over to the entire economy. An avalanche of bankruptcies may ensue.” Yet,
in our setting two other feedback mechanism are at play. First the decrease of
financial capital and production capacity reduces the strength of competition
and hence the stability of the price system. Second the sectoral interlinkages
propagate rationing shocks throughout the system. These rationing shocks play
the role of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks described in Acemoglu et al.
(2012) as the drivers of aggregate volatility.
3.5 Financial constraints and phase transition
The simulations’ results reported above suggest that, depending on the strength
of the financial constraints, the model exhibits two very different regimes. One
is characterized by general equilibrium, low aggregate volatility and financial
stability. The other is characterized by market disequilibrium and financial
fragility, which are linked by a positive feedback loop that yield high aggregate
volatility and eventually crisis and crashes.
In order to test the assumption that financial constraints are the determi-
nants of these two regimes, we run a series of 750 Monte-Carlo simulations (MC)
where we let the default wealth of firms and banks vary (the other parameters
being fixed as in table 1). More precisely, the default wealth of firms, which
we denote by wf , takes the values (0.1250, 0.25, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1,
2), this of banks, which we denote by wb, takes the values (0.5, 1, 1.25, 1.5,
1.75, 2, 2.25, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 5, 10, 20, 50) and we run 5 MC over 500 periods
for each possible combination of the variables wf and wb. Table 3 reports the
mean (over the five MC) of the number of periods for which the model is in an
ǫ-equilibrium (with ǫ = 0, 1) as a function of the default wealth of firms and
banks, while Table 4 reports the mean volatility of GDP for the same set of
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wf\wb 0.5 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25 2.5 3 3.5 4 5
0.125 0 0 0 0 0 29.4 0 17.6 180 106 246 233
0.25 0 0 0 0 0.6 109 203 138 170 237 266 299
0.4 0 8.8 3.2 130 129 227 76.5 227 296 310 272 312
0.5 0 8.2 85.4 209 212 248 254 239 184 261 248 308
0.6 15 68.6 246 163 245 200 253 267 243 281 271 315
0.7 63.6 131 260 242 197 309 246 264 313 237 308 347
0.8 130 236 249 284 227 241 301 333 265 326 297 321
0.9 144 279 296 264 273 287 243 212 212 340 268 325
1 236 294 367 229 234 278 334 199 272 266 328 313
2 269 305 241 289 286 293 277 293 338 270 323 366
Table 3: nb of equilibria (values of wf\wb in line\column)
wf\wb 0.5 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25 2.5 3 3.5 4 5
0.125 22.7 16.8 20.8 21.2 11.2 12.6 8.75 12.8 12.3 4.27 4.34 4.5
0.25 23.5 11.6 17.3 12.8 8.79 8.35 17.8 8.84 4.12 3.97 4.08 4.13
0.4 23.3 10.4 8.24 3.93 10.8 6.22 4.88 4.46 6.17 3.81 3.92 3.91
0.5 15.3 18.7 3.84 8.06 3.92 6.76 3.85 3.82 3.82 3.79 3.74 3.65
0.6 12.4 10.5 3.75 7.71 6.46 3.8 3.54 3.68 3.71 3.66 3.82 3.75
0.7 5.9 6.8 3.73 3.57 3.62 3.44 3.83 3.55 3.7 3.69 3.48 3.67
0.8 3.33 3.45 3.48 3.8 3.38 3.44 3.35 3.75 3.4 3.42 3.44 3.62
1 3.76 3.74 3.55 3.29 3.44 3.53 3.73 3.47 3.56 3.31 3.27 3.17
2 3.06 3.09 3.26 3.2 2.95 3.2 2.86 2.97 2.94 3.22 3.14 3.25
Table 4: volatility of GDP (values of wf\wb in line\column)
simulations10. Figure 8 provides a graphical illustration of these results11.
The hypothesis that the financial constraints govern the regime of the model
is confirmed by the identification of a phase transition between the equilibrium
and the disequilibrium states of the model, which materializes as a critical line
(highlighted in red in table 2) in the (wf,wb) plane. For small values of the
pair(wf,wb) the model almost never is in equilibrium and exhibits high volatil-
ity, for large values of the pair (wf,wb) the model settles in equilibrium and
exhibits low volatility. When the critical line is crossed, there is an abrupt
transition between the two regimes.
A preliminary exploration of the data through linear regression suggests
that the relationship between default wealths and number of equilibria is ex-
ponential and that the influence of both variables, wf and wb is of a similar
magnitude. Figure 9a illustrates this point by showing a scatter plot of the
number of ǫ-equilbria against log(wf ∗ wb). It suggests a logistic dependence
between the two quantities, which is confirmed in figure 9b and by a series of
10Results corresponding to wealth banks of 10,20,50 are omitted in these tables as they do
not change the qualitative nor the quantitative features of the results.
11The values on the x and y axis of figure 8 are ordinal, i.e 1 (resp. 15) corresponds to the
smallest (reps. largest) value of wealth bank
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Figure 8: Phase transition under financial constraints
regression analysis reported in appendix A. There is statistical evidence that
the financial constraints explains the regime in which the model lies and that
the transitions between the two regimes is well-described by a logistic function,
what is consistent with the idea of a phase-transition between equilibrium and
non-equilibrium regimes. In this respect, our results are very similar and in-
spired by those obtained in Gualdi et al. (2013): these authors show that phase
transitions between equilibrium and disequilibrium can be driven by small shifts
in firms’ employment policy.
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Figure 9: Logistic model of equilibrium transition
These results are robust with respect to change in the value of the other key
financial parameter that is the interest rate. As reported in appendix B, results
of simulation for a default interest rate varying between 0 and 6 percents show
a picture that is qualitatively equivalent to the one presented in this section.
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3.6 A financial management experiment
In the simulations presented in the previous subsection, crisis are so acute that
they lead to the collapse of the economy. From a theoretical point of view, this
helps contrasting the equilibrium and disequilibrium regimes of the model. Still,
this prevents any application of the model to questions other than theoretical.
In order to overcome this limitation and address issues such as the origins of
aggregate volatility in a dynamical setting, we investigate in this subsection
remedies to this systemic fragility.
The roots of fragility eventually lay with the individual firm. Therefore,
increasing individual firms’ resilience shall lead to a decrease in the magnitude
of systemic crisis and ease the recovery therefrom. The default financial policy
of the firm is to distribute a dividend as soon as it makes a profit in the period
(see 2.5.3). This very myopic behavior might be conductive to fragility as it
prevents the firm from reconstituting a strong enough capital basis after it has
been affected by a negative shock. In order to further investigate this point, we
consider an alternative profit distribution policy which consists in distributing
profits only if the current capital of the firm is greater than a benchmark, which
is set equal to the initial value of the capital. If this condition holds, the totality
of the profit is distributed. The use of this alternative financial management rule
does not affect the behavior of convergence to equilibrium reported in subsection
3.3 for parameter values that do not induce financial constraints. However in
a setting with financial constraints, using the same parameter setting than in
subsection 3.4, the results are qualitatively different (see figure 10). The model
now exhibits shifts between an equilibrium regime where prices stay around
their equilibrium value and aggregate volatility is very low, and a disequilibrium
regime where prices fluctuate away from their equilibrium value and aggregate
volatility is high.
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Figure 10: Markets
The mechanisms that trigger a crisis are similar to these described in sub-
section 3.4. In a context where the distribution of wealth is dispersed (see figure
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11), a shock to the price system triggers a positive feedback loop from price
fluctuations to losses and bankruptcies then to reduced competition and fur-
ther price fluctuations (see figures 10 and 12). The main differences with the
processes that lead to collapse in section 3.4 is that the productive sector is
now more resilient: bankruptcy crisis are less acute and the economy eventu-
ally recovers. This is due to the fact that firms now have time to recapitalize
themselves after a shock. As can be observed in figures 11 and 12, the total
wealth of firms increase after bankruptcies thanks to funding of new firms plus
disequilibrium profits. One also observes a reduction in the dispersion of the
distribution of wealth, which restores competition and eventually equilibrium in
the economy. This dynamical pattern for the financial capital of the productive
sector is in strong contrast with this observed in 3.4 where a downward spiral
starts as soon as financial fragility bites. Nevertheless, once the equilibrium
regime is restored, financial constraints foster an increase in the dispersion of
firms’ wealth and pave the way for the next crisis.
Hence, one observes long-term fluctuations between an equilibrium regime
characterized by stability of price and production and a disequilibrium one char-
acterized by price instability and financial fragility. This crisis regime is the
carrier of aggregate volatility in the model. In other words, local disequilib-
rium in a decentralized price system and networked financial fragility are the
micro-economic origins of aggregate volatility in our model. In the next section,
we investigate the influence of the structure of the production network on the
magnitude of these aggregate fluctuations.
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Figure 11: Firms’ wealth
4 Network structure, equilibrium, and aggre-
gate volatility
The model introduced in subsection 3.6 allows to represent dynamic fluctuations
between equilibrium and disequilibrium. In this section, we use it to analyze in
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a dynamical setting the relationships between network structure and aggregate
volatilty put forward by Fisher and Vega-Redondo (2006), Battiston et al. (2007)
and Acemoglu et al. (2012). This analysis is performed along two dimensions.
First we analyze the relationship between network structure and the process
of relaxation to equilibrium as well as equilibrium stability. In order to do
so, we measure, for a sample of production networks, the average number of
periods in which the model is in an ǫ-equilibrium (for ǫ = 0.1). This is an
indirect measure of aggregate volatility based on the equivalence established in
the previous section between disequilibrium and aggregate volatility. Second,
we perform a direct analysis of the relationship between network structure and
aggregate volatility. There, we measure, for the same sample of production
networks, the volatility of GDP observed during the timeframe of a simulation.
Our characterization of the network’s structure is based among others on
the degree sequence, which associates to a sector g the sum δg :=
∑N
h=1 ωh,g
corresponding to the share of sector g’s output in the input supply of the en-
tire economy. We then focus on the following network statistics: the mean of
the degree sequence δ :=
1
N
∑N
g=1 δg; the coefficient of variation of the degree
sequence υ1 :=
√∑N
g=1(δg − δ)2√
Nδ
, which is used as a first-order measure of the
asymmetry of the network in Acemoglu et al. (2012); the second order inter-
connectivity coefficient υ2 :=
∑N
g=1
∑
h 6=g
∑
k 6=g,h ωh,gωk,gδhδk, introduced by
Acemoglu et al. (2012) to measure the extent to which sectors with high degrees
are interconnected to one another through common suppliers; and the cluster-
ing coefficient a` la Grindrod-Zhang-Horvath (see Grindrod (2002) and Zhang
et al. (2005)) defined as κ :=
∑N
g=1
δg
δ
∑
h 6=g
∑
k 6=g,h ωˆg,hωˆh,kωˆk,g
(
∑
h 6=g ωˆg,h)
2 −∑h 6=g ωˆ2g,h where the ωˆ
are normalized versions of ω obtained by dividing by the largest coefficient in
ω.
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Our analysis is based on a series of 750 Monte-Carlo simulations where we
let the network structure vary (the initial wealth of firm is set to 0.5, this of
banks to 2.5 and the other parameters are fixed as in table 1). More precisely,
we run 5 MC over 500 periods for 150 distinct random production networks (the
coefficients are drawn at random according to a lognormal distribution and then
normalized to ensure input shares of all sectors add up to one). We then analyze
the dependencies between the number of ǫ-equilibria and the GDP volatility on
the one hand and the network statistics introduced above on the other hand.
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Figure 13: Variations with the degree
Figure 13 illustrates our results by plotting the number of periods in ǫ-
equilibrium (resp. gdp volatility) obtained in simulations as a function of the
coefficient of variation of the degree sequence of the network. We perform
a linear regression12 for both indicators using as independent variables first
the coefficient of variation of the degree sequence only and then together with
the second order interconnectivity coefficient. Using the standard deviation
instead of the coefficient of variation and/or the clustering coefficient instead of
the second order interconnectivity coefficient give similar results. Results are
reported in appendix C.
Our results confirm these of Acemoglu et al. (2012) in the sense that there
is a significant statistical dependence between aggregate volatility of GDP and
both the coefficient of variation and the second order interconnectivity of the
degree sequence. The same is true if we use our indirect measure of volatility
based on number of ǫ-equilibria/ mean residency time in equilibrium. A very
puzzling fact however is that though the coefficient of variation has a positive
impact on aggregate volatility as in Acemoglu et al. (2012), we find that the
second order interconnectivity has a negative one, oppositely to the results of
these authors. The second order interconnectivity coefficient, or similarly the
clustering coefficient, measures the extent to which sectors with high degrees
12We use the applied econometrics toolbox made freely available by James P. LeSage, see
LeSage (1999), who is gratefully acknowledged.
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(those that are major suppliers to other sectors) are interconnected to one an-
other through common suppliers. This points towards a possible explanation of
the opposed relationship we find. In Acemoglu et al. (2012), the main influence
of the coefficient of variation seems to be on the transmission of shocks between
sectors. In our setting, this feature of transmission of shocks seems to be more
than compensated by the fact that increased interconnectivity implies larger
markets for intermediary consumption and hence further price-stabilizing com-
petition that fosters convergence to equilibrium. The process of convergence
isn’t represented in Acemoglu et al. (2012). This might explain the difference.
We shall argue that our results have a stronger empirical content as we mea-
sure the actual volatility of GDP in a dynamical setting rather than its asymp-
totic properties in a static setting. Additionally, our results about the number
of equilibria show that the network structure has a significative impact on the
average residency time in equilibrium. These results somehow transcend these
of Acemoglu et al. (2012) as they show that the network structure matters even
before equilibrium is established, which is the starting point of Acemoglu et al.
(2012). Moreover, we do not need to resort to exogenous productivity shocks
to explain the origin of aggregate fluctuations. In our setting, the origin of fluc-
tuations can eventually be traced to the microscopic shocks to the price system
that come along evolutionary dynamics and that bring about disequilibrium and
volatility when they are amplified by financial accelerator mechanisms.
5 Conclusion
This paper confirms previous findings (see Gintis, 2007; Gintis and Mandel,
2012) that evolutionary dynamics applied to decentralized systems of private
prices have strong properties of convergence towards general equilibrium. We
have built on these properties to equip the standard real-business cycle model
a` la Long and Plosser (1983) with agent-based dynamics. In particular, we
have introduced financially constrained production and a primitive financial
architecture a` la Delli Gatti et al. (2010). We have revisited in this framework
the relationships between equilibrium, financial fragility and aggregate volatility.
Our first contribution is to show that the stability of equilibrium and the
dynamical regime of the economy crucially depend on the relative strength of
resource and financial constraints. When financial constraints are weak, the
economy behaves as an efficient mechanism for the allocation of scarce resources
thanks to the emergence of a general equilibrium. When financial constraints
bite, i.e outside a barter economy, there is a correspondence and a positive
feedback loop between disequilibrium and financial fragility: small price varia-
tions can trigger financial imbalances that get amplified by financial accelerator
mechanisms, these imbalances lead to reduced productive capacity and compet-
itive pressure, less competition favors out-of-equilibrium excursions of the price
system, what leads to additional financial imbalances. These findings allow to
explicit the link between the theory of financial fragility (see Greenwald and
Stiglitz, 1993; Delli Gatti et al., 2010, and earlier contributions) and general
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equilibrium.
Our second contribution is to provide dynamic and endogenous foundations
to the findings of Acemoglu et al. (2012) on the network origins of aggregate
fluctuations. In our dynamical setting, we can measure aggregate volatility along
dimensions that are consistent with empirical observations, i.e through time
rather than as a static response to a distribution of shocks. We can also trace
the origin of aggregate fluctuations to the microscopic shocks to the price system
that come along evolutionary dynamics and that bring about disequilibrium and
volatility when they are amplified by financial accelerator mechanisms. More
generally, we show that volatility materializes mainly out-of-equilibrium and
that the network structure affects aggregate volatility because it impacts the
speed of convergence to and the stability of equilibrium.
Though the financial constraints play a central role in our analysis, our rep-
resentation of the financial system is rather primitive. There are only interim
lived financial assets, no precautionary savings, no investment. There is no in-
terbank clearing mechanism, no bound on banks’ leverage, no monetary policy.
These gaps to be filled provide elements of a research program that could aim at
a better understanding of the transmission channel of monetary policy thanks
to refined models of the financial system (for initial contributions in that di-
rections, see Battiston et al. (2012b) or Geanakoplos et al. (2012)). There are
two key differences between this research program and this initiated by Arrow
and Debreu (see Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959)) on general equilibrium with
financial markets. First, the focus is on the behavior of financial actors (i.e
financial institutions) rather than on financial assets. Second, the inquiry is
about the impact financial markets have on the creation of resources rather
than on their allocation.
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Appendix A: Statistical analysis of the phase tran-
sition
Regressions ran on the results of the 750 MC simulations described in subsection
3.5 confirm a logistic dependence between the product of default wealths and
the number of equilibria.
• If we use as dependent variable a binary variable “equilibrium”, which
is 1 if and only if the number of periods in which the model is in an ǫ-
equilibria is greater than 200, and as independent variable the logarithm
of the wealth products, log(wb ∗ wf) we obtain the following results for
logit and probit regressions:
Logit Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dependent Variable = equilibrium binary
McFadden R-squared = 0.6087
Estrella R-squared = 0.6543
LR-ratio, 2*(Lu-Lr) = 103.3550
LR p-value = 0.0000
Log-Likelihood = -33.2176
# of iterations = 9
Convergence criterion = 3.106804e-09
Nobs, Nvars = 150, 2
# of 0’s, # of 1’s = 38, 112
***************************************************************
Variable Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
constant 1.229688 3.589071 0.000451
log wealth 3.593064 5.292620 0.000000
Probit Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dependent Variable = equilibrium binary
McFadden R-squared = 0.6022
Estrella R-squared = 0.6478
LR-ratio, 2*(Lu-Lr) = 102.2491
LR p-value = 0.0000
Log-Likelihood = -33.7706
# of iterations = 8
Convergence criterion = 1.2064068e-08
Nobs, Nvars = 150, 2
# of 0’s, # of 1’s = 38, 112
***************************************************************
Variable Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
constant 0.642919 3.642938 0.000372
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log wealth 1.933429 5.983258 0.000000
• If we fit directly a logistic function by using as dependent variable an
index of the number of periods in which the model is in an ǫ-equilibrum
(normalized so that the maximum value is 1) and as independent variable
the value of the logistic function
(wb ∗ wf)
1 + wb ∗ wf , we obtain the following
results for an OLS regression:
Ordinary Least-squares Estimates
Dependent Variable = equilibrium index
R-squared = 0.7220
Rbar-squared = 0.7201
sigma^2 = 0.0234
Durbin-Watson = 1.1419
Nobs, Nvars = 150, 2
***************************************************************
Variable Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
constant 0.001668 0.048724 0.961205
logistic wealth 1.034190 19.604267 0.000000
Appendix B: Sensitivity with respect to the in-
terest rate
In order to check the robustness of our results with respect to variation of the
interest rate parameter, we have ran 800 MC simulations where the interest rate
take values in (0, 0.05, 0.01, 0.015, 0.02, 0.025, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06) , the wealth
of firms in (0.25, 0.5, 075, 1), this of banks in (1, 2.5, 5, 10). For each possible
combination of the parameters, we run 5 MC of the model over 500 periods.
We give below the mean (over the 5 MC) of the number of periods in which the
model is in an ǫ-equilibrium, the lines being indexed by the default wealth of
firms, the columns by this of bank. The qualitative picture is identical to this
described in section 3.5 and regression analysis gives similar results.
ρ = 0 :


0 230.0 275.0 351.0
1.4 306.0 290.0 304.0
280.0 220.0 297.0 266.0
339.0 272.0 339.0 308.0

 ρ = 0.005 :


0 143.2 316.6 301.8
43.2 268.0 277.2 329.2
208.2 246.6 283.6 341.2
217.8 310.2 302.6 338.4


ρ = 0.01 :


0 137.8 298.8 316.2
8.2 239.4 308.2 324.0
124.8 330.4 357.8 309.2
294.4 198.6 313.0 277.4

 ρ = 0.015 :


0 187.75 308.8 330.2
42.2 254.2 274.6 299.4
191.4 259.8 274.0 312.4
292.2 269.8 280.6 281.6


ρ = 0.02 :


0 184.0 261.8 319.2
47.8 163.6 268.2 339.6
219.4 328.8 313.6 309.6
243.4 263.2 293.8 317.8

 ρ = 0.025 :


0 142.0 297.2 264.2
0 233.0 321.0 318.6
174.8 328.6 326.4 315.4
200.0 295.4 316.2 333.8


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ρ = 0.03 :


0 130.6 339.8 342.8
27.4 263.2 272.8 279.2
183.0 310.6 344.4 328.8
230.4 305.4 268.8 364.2

 ρ = 0.04 :


0 108.8 171.6 343.0
24.8 141.0 322.2 369.2
235.4 373.6 269.0 344.2
229.8 268.2 228.2 292.0


ρ = 0.05 :


0 28.6 260.6 341.4
0 274.4 343.4 313.8
152.8 214.4 287.0 329.0
230.0 275.0 285.0 297.0

 ρ = 0.06 :


0 90.8 251.8 277.0
0 243.0 280.8 293.0
285.2 332.2 331.8 355.0
278.8 219.6 309.6 356.8


Appendix C: Statistical analysis of the impact of
the production network structure
Ordinary Least-squares Estimates
Dependent Variable = Nb_Equilibria
R-squared = 0.4209
Rbar-squared = 0.4170
sigma^2 = 8435.1251
Durbin-Watson = 1.8847
Nobs, Nvars = 150, 2
***************************************************************
Variable Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
constant 392.004497 22.791586 0.000000
coeffvar_degree -358.865149 -10.370942 0.000000
Ordinary Least-squares Estimates
Dependent Variable = Nb_Equilibria
R-squared = 0.3811
Rbar-squared = 0.3769
sigma^2 = 9014.4068
Durbin-Watson = 1.9492
Nobs, Nvars = 150, 2
***************************************************************
Variable Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
constant -42.785244 -1.437832 0.152593
sqrt_snd_degree 528.325294 9.546409 0.000000
Ordinary Least-squares Estimates
Dependent Variable = Nb_Equilibria
R-squared = 0.6583
Rbar-squared = 0.6536
sigma^2 = 5011.2727
Durbin-Watson = 1.8730
Nobs, Nvars = 150, 3
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***************************************************************
Variable Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
constant 143.146573 5.118240 0.000001
coeffvar_degree -298.450721 -10.919076 0.000000
sqrt_snd_degree 427.330089 10.105348 0.000000
Ordinary Least-squares Estimates
Dependent Variable = GDP_volatility_mean
R-squared = 0.2451
Rbar-squared = 0.2400
sigma^2 = 0.2698
Durbin-Watson = 1.8292
Nobs, Nvars = 150, 2
***************************************************************
Variable Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
constant 5.135981 52.799750 0.000000
coeffvar_degree 1.356440 6.931263 0.000000
Ordinary Least-squares Estimates
Dependent Variable = GDP_volatility_mean
R-squared = 0.3057
Rbar-squared = 0.3010
sigma^2 = 0.2481
Durbin-Watson = 1.9886
Nobs, Nvars = 150, 2
***************************************************************
Variable Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
constant 6.959425 44.576605 0.000000
sqrt_snd_degree -2.343758 -8.071810 0.000000
Ordinary Least-squares Estimates
Dependent Variable = GDP_volatility_mean
R-squared = 0.4527
Rbar-squared = 0.4452
sigma^2 = 0.1969
Durbin-Watson = 1.9817
Nobs, Nvars = 150, 3
***************************************************************
Variable Coefficient t-statistic t-probability
constant 6.288718 35.868118 0.000000
coeffvar_degree 1.076593 6.283068 0.000000
sqrt_snd_degree -1.979440 -7.466842 0.000000
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